The presentation is based exclusively on Michael B. Oren's masterly work "Six Days of War." Inputs on Clausewitz are from Hew Strachan's "Clausewitz's On War."

The audience is a graduate class on Negotiations and Diplmacy

An extract from Oren's "Six Days of War" about the first moments of the War. The presentation is about the diplomatic processes that led to this moment.

The specific questions that this presentation attempts to answer

Some relevant factors about Israel in 1966

The flip side of the coin in Israel's diplomatic position. It had very significant weaknesses and the increase in security referred to in the previous slide had reduced, but not done away with, the existential and other threats that Israel faced everyday.

Israel's chief opponent was Egypt. Egypt was led by the charismatic Nasser who had mobilised the "Arab Street" to generate a pan-Arab support base. The nature of the "Arab Street" and its wild enthusiasm for Nasser is evident in the video.

Rulers in the Middle East can be made or broken by the "Street". The Arab Spring is only the latest outburst of the "Street" and demonstrates its continuing relevance to political processes.

What made Nasser such a compelling figure?

Nasser's position had become shaky and his standing, degraded, by 1967. Egypt had attacked Yemen in a proxy war with Saudi Arabia, was estranged from the US and engaged in a constant and debilitating struggle for leadership of the Arab world with other countries in the region.

Although major Arab states in the Middle East did not always enjoy the best of relations, they were united when it came to Israel. A series of conference were held in 1964-65 in which the Arab League decided on a number of anti-Israel measures that are enumerated in the slide. Guerilla raids by Palestinians were a regular and disruptive feature of life in Israel. Inflammatory rhetoric against Israel was also common.

Israeli intelligence assessed that war with the Arabs was inevitable. The Arabs would strike sooner or later.They were aware that some kind of an attack was being planned. They were uncertain about the date as well as the possible causus belli. It appears that they did not anticipate that the Arabs would unite on the issue of diverting the Jordan River.
The point to be noted for the purpose of this presentation is that the Israeli government was actively expecting hostilities.

The Middle East also featured in Cold War equations. The Soviets invested heavily in Egypt and Syria.
It is interesting and relevant to note that many Israeli leaders were of Eastern European extraction and were familiar with, and feared, the Soviet Union. They understood that active Soviet intervention on the side of Egypt and Syria in case of a conflict could have disastrous consequences for Israel.
All political and diplomatic calculations by the Israelis had the Soviets factored in.

The purpose of this part to introduce readers to the framework within which Israeli decision makers operated. Statecraft is usually the direct responsibility of the chief executive, the Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol in this case, because that is the only level where the various components of foreign policy, viz., diplomacy, intelligence, military operations and propaganda combine.

The purpose is also to introduce participants to the complexity of the process with multiple stakeholders, constituencies and interlocutors.

Israel was arrayed against a combine of Arab States. This rivalry (or conflict) - as pointed out in an earlier slide - was being played out in the context of the Cold War. The western states were more closely aligned with Israel while Egypt and Syria were squarely in the Soviet camp.

The main players in Israel for this case study:-
From Left to Right: Levi Eshkol, Prime Minister: General Moshe Dayan; Defence Minister (from June 1, 1967) and General Yitzahk Rabin; Chief of Staff, Israeli Defence Force

Israel, being a parliamentary democracy, the Prime Minister operaeted in an environment with multiple constituencies and institutions. The Prime Minister had the difficult task of synthesizing, either by force of logic or will, a position that was acceptable to all constituencies.
In a democracy this is difficult at the best of times. During the crisis that we are studying, they generated enormous pressures on the Prime Minister. Diplomatic decision-making became a very complex exercise.

Another dimension in this case study relates to the multiple inputs the Prime Minister received on a daily - sometimes several times a day - basis. The Prime Minister's principal - and most frequent - interlocutors are listed in this slide. The inputs required very careful analysis, as they impacted decisions that concerned national survival of Israel.

Decisions of the Prime Minister were converted into action of the following kinds - negotiation or diplomacy; military action (or force); covert diplomacy and propaganda. These various types of action were often carried out independently but were integrated at the level of the Prime Minister and the cabinet.

Israel has a small standing army but can mobilise almost its entire population at very short notice. Israel's mobilisation drill is a very impressive specimen of military efficiency.

The intel about poison gas profoundly disturbed Israelis. Keep in mind that these events were unfolding barely two decades after the holocaust.

UNEF = UN peacekeepers stationed in Sinai after the 1956 conflict to physically separate the Israeli and Egyptian armies

Current situation is Egyptian troops in Sinai + UN peacekeepers withdrawn + Egyptian overflights over Dimona.

Israel chooses not to escalate. But note that while it is diplomatically very active, there is an underlying certainty that war is inevitable. The Israeli Defence Force is convinced that there is going to be war. Since its entire doctrine is based on deterrence and preemption, they are by force of habit and instinct, already preparing for war.

Its first diplomatic efforts to gather support from the United States fail. Simultaneously, it starts becoming apparent that war might actually break out. This understanding seeps across the entire decision-making apparatus. The apparatus is confident of its prospects in case of conflict but recognises that things can go terribly wrong. There is no enthusiasm for war apparent yet.

The Prime Minister is mostly concentrating on diplomacy. The Israeli Defence Force advances its preparation for war. It is apparent that the Israeli doctrine believes that attack is the best form of Defence. The Israelis will not fight a defensive battle.

A combination of Israeli restraint and apparent US non-interference gives Egypt the impression that it has the upper hand.
Note that Egypt-Israel battles in the past (1948 and 1956) pre-date influx of Soviet equipment and advisors. The Egyptian high command's estimates are based on a calculus that is very different from what it appears today. Israel was yet to become a first-rate military power.

Egypt has not escalated in the last 2 days but Israel is running out of diplomatic options. The US continues to equivocate. The Soviets make it apparent that their sympathies are actively with the Egyptians and Syrians.

Is Israel friendless in the face of conflict?

Israel desperately seeking diplomatic support. It not looks towards its partners in the 1956 conflict. It also realises that it needs a more accurate assessment of the extent of Soviet support for Egypt and Syrian in case conflict does break out. This has an enormous influence on whether Israel chooses to negotiate or fight.

A week after Egyptian troops flood Sinai, the situation does not look good for Israel. There is intense pressure on Eshkol.

The Israeli Defence Forces start worrying that their inaction in the face of Egyptian sudden moves may have a direct negative impact on Israeli security. The deterrence on which Israel relies to prevent its neighbours from attacking has been weakened.

A week after the conflict, the Prime Minister and his Defence chief discuss what the war will look like.

Note that war is beginning to gain mindspace in the decision-making apparatus. The specifics of how a campaign are being fought are appearing in discussions.

Dayan, later to become Foreign Minister, provides his strategic estimate of what would constitute an Israel victory.

Note how complex it is to determine Egyptian intent. Decision-makers are operating in an environment of insufficient information. The Fog of War is well developed.
Note too, the disagreements and difference of opinion at the highest level.

The Israeli military is asking the Prime Minister for approval to commence the process of actively conducting hostilities.
Eshkol, at his level, feels that even though war is certain, he cannot yet approve war. Rabin is now convinced that Israel must attack and that it must attack now. Eshkol notes that there is no change in the Egyptian deployments in the last few days and that Israel is actively seeking support from other countries. The timing is not right for a preemptive strike.

Egypt is also prepared for war. Egyptian leadership is now preparing to escalate. It is convinced that it is in a win-win situation. Israel will either bleed because it is mobilised, or it will attack, in which case, the Egyptians expect to defeat them.

Egypt blocks Israeli access to the port of Eilat on the Red Sea. This was a nightmare scenario for the Israelis and a ground for war - a fact that they had made often frequently and publicly.

Egypt is escalating further, beyond the point where Israelis had declared would be ground for war. Other Arab countries, sensing that Israel is under pressure, are concentrating their forces.

Israel still has not responded. The pressures on the leadership are immense. To the public they appear to be doing nothing while Israel's existence is at stake.

General Rabin has a breakdown and is temporarily incapacitated. This increases the pressures on Eshkol.

May 23 marks one of the turning points of the crisis because the Soviets begin to feel that Egypt is overplaying its hand.

Egypt is exultant. It has acted very aggressively and Israel has not reacted. Neither has the United States. It believes that it may have outwitted the Israelis.

However, the Soviets are not happy.

Egypt now feels let down by the Soviets. Having escalated upto this point, partly on the basis of Soviet support, it is in a bind. The Soviets obviously are beginning to have doubts about the course of action that Egypt has chosen to take.

A critical day.
Egypt has crossed redlines. Israel's principal ally, the United States, has basically left it on its own. The military feels that they must strike, and strike first. The pub;ic wants action - but not necessarily war.

These are some of the questions raised by Ministers at a meeting to discuss the situation.
Difference of opinion
Army insisting on preemptive strike
Some Ministers NOT convinced that war was inevitable
Some insisted that preemptive strike was paramount

Israel has been cornered. There is no option but to fight.

This and the next slide:-
Several times during the day, the army requests permission to strike. The Ministers feel the pressure.
After much soul-searching, they still cannot bring themselves to agree to war.
The military begins to doubt the ability of the political leadership to manage the crisis.
Weizman is a more aggressive commander than Rabin, and after he takes over Rabin's job in the evening, decides to move armour towards strike locations.

Israel making an all-out diplomatic effort. They know that if they fail to get American intervention or a security guarantee, there will be war.

The meetings with Rusk and Johnson do not go off well.

11 days after its trips move into Sinai and 4 days after the Tiran blockade, there is still no Israeli or US reaction.
Egypt therefore feels encourage to escalate and decides to launch an attack on Israel.

Another turning point in the crisis.
Near panic in Israel as it realises that diplomatic options have run out. Israeli intelligence scores a coup and obtain plans of Egyptian attack to be launched in a few hours.
Those plans are immediately made known to the US - even as Johnson meets Eban. The US in turn transmits this knowledge to the Soviets and asks them to rein in Egyptians.

Events moving at a blinding pace. Frantic diplomacy underway in Moscow, Tel Aviv, Cairo and Washington. The Soviets are shocked by Israeli intel. They understand the military implications of the lack of surprise and tell Egytians to call of attack.

Setback for the Egyptians.
However, there are differences within the Soviet leadership and Soviet Defence Minister in his interaction with the Egyptian delegation makes some encouraging remarks.

Egypt makes a major error in reading Moscow. That notwithstanding, Egypt is forced to call of its strike about 30 minutes before its launch.

Israel makes up its mind that it has no option left. It prepares to go to war.

Eshkol losing ground internally. His leadership is being seen as indecisive. Diplomacy has not borne results. The public, the political parties and the military are restive.

The Army is restive

Eshkol has a disastrous meeting with the Generals. They vent their ire at not being allowed to strike and tell Eshkol that his diplomacy has not just been a failure but a waste of time.
Eshkol holds his own but is shaken. Refuses to give permission to strike even then.
Imagine the pressures on Eshkol!

Very significant change in Israeli attitude.
Israel now believes that it has no option but to strike. The purpose of diplomacy is to ascertain the cost of ignoring the USs position that Israel should not initiate hostilities.

Diplomacy of a different kind - but diplomacy nevertheless. A secret meeting between the Mossad chief and Israeli Defence Secretary.

Dayan's entry means that war is certain, that Dayan will manage the war and that Eshkol's time is limited.

This and the next slide.
The Israelis have made up their mind. It is now a question of when to strike.

Soviet efforts to bully Israel continue.

Strategy must define this.

Israel met each of these objectives.
The lesson is that we have to define victory before we commence an operation. The parameters of victory must be clearly defined in strategy.

Israel outfought the Egyptians. They did not avoid conflict.