Hurricane Preparedness (Galveston & Andrew)
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PRESENTATION OUTLINE
Embracing Reality
Chris A. Soliz
Columbia Southern University
INTRODUCTION
- Compare 2 historical events
- Discuss changes in response strategies between events
- Technological improvements
- Legislative improvements
This case study reviews two of the largest and deadliest hurricanes in US history.
Rather than focus on response actions during the crisis, the more useful story lies in the conditions leading up to each event.
Result: each event represents missed opportunities to embrace the reality of disaster potential
Let's gain a general understanding of each...
- to plan successfully
- to build community resiliency
Rather than focus on response actions during the crisis, the more useful story lies in the conditions leading up to each event.
Result: each event represents missed opportunities to embrace the reality of disaster potential
Let's gain a general understanding of each...
- to plan successfully
- to build community resiliency
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SUMMARY
- US Weather Bureau vs. Cuba
- Centralized US forecasting & warning system
- Gov. desire to avoid "over-warning" the public
Political Environment:
- US assisted Cuban revolutionaries gain independence from Spain in 1898.
- US still administered the island in 1900
- US Weather Bureau (Director Willis Moore) viewed Cuban (Jesuit) forecasting as primitive
- Moore was very active in discrediting / shutting out the Jesuit system, which was actually very advanced
"To the Americans, Cuban forecasts seemed hysterical, despite their extraordinary history of accuracy (Roker, 2015, p. 32)."
- US assisted Cuban revolutionaries gain independence from Spain in 1898.
- US still administered the island in 1900
- US Weather Bureau (Director Willis Moore) viewed Cuban (Jesuit) forecasting as primitive
- Moore was very active in discrediting / shutting out the Jesuit system, which was actually very advanced
"To the Americans, Cuban forecasts seemed hysterical, despite their extraordinary history of accuracy (Roker, 2015, p. 32)."
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RESULT
- Sea Wall declined
- No warnings
- No emergency plans
- Category 4
- 10,000 fatalities
In part because of the tension, and in part because of the low index of preparedness.
- US Weather Bureau believed storms would turn towards Florida.
- Therefore Galveston officials made no preparations
- The idea of a protective Sea Wall was not embraced... until after the disaster
Centralized forecasting and warnings eliminated local expertise
- Bulky system was concerned with retaining political authority rather than public protection.
"It was for Washington, not for local weathermen, to determine what was going on locally (Roker, 2015, p. 32)."
- US Weather Bureau believed storms would turn towards Florida.
- Therefore Galveston officials made no preparations
- The idea of a protective Sea Wall was not embraced... until after the disaster
Centralized forecasting and warnings eliminated local expertise
- Bulky system was concerned with retaining political authority rather than public protection.
"It was for Washington, not for local weathermen, to determine what was going on locally (Roker, 2015, p. 32)."
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SUMMARY
- Low prioritization of risk
- Extremely slow infrastructure development
- Lack of political support
"Florida began to address coastal management, disaster preparedness, and hazard mitigation systematically during the 1970's in respons to a growing awareness that the state was highly vulnerable to coastal storms and to several federal government mandates (Mittler, 1997, p. 6)."
- 1981 adopted philosophy of Comprehensive EM (4 phases of activity)
- 1983 State Select Committee on Growth Mgmt. (No conclusions)
- 1986 Citizens Advisory Committee (found lack of coordination)
- 1987 Governor's Hurricane Conference
- 1990 Speaker's Task Force on Emergency Preparedness
- 1991 & 92 Failed legislation
- 1992 Governor's Disaster Planning and Response Review Committee (Lewis Committee)
- 1993 - ANDREW!
- 1981 adopted philosophy of Comprehensive EM (4 phases of activity)
- 1983 State Select Committee on Growth Mgmt. (No conclusions)
- 1986 Citizens Advisory Committee (found lack of coordination)
- 1987 Governor's Hurricane Conference
- 1990 Speaker's Task Force on Emergency Preparedness
- 1991 & 92 Failed legislation
- 1992 Governor's Disaster Planning and Response Review Committee (Lewis Committee)
- 1993 - ANDREW!
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RESULTS
- Lack of coordinated emergency response plan
- Uninformed public
- Under-developed emergency mgmt. agency
- Overwhelmed resources
Virtually all of the Lewis Committee findings were realized.
- 94 recommendations, 38 required legislation
- 4 key needs
- improved communications
- evac, shelter, post-disaster plans
- intergovernmental coordination
- training
Unfortunately, these predictions provide a concise summary of the response deficiencies.
- 94 recommendations, 38 required legislation
- 4 key needs
- improved communications
- evac, shelter, post-disaster plans
- intergovernmental coordination
- training
Unfortunately, these predictions provide a concise summary of the response deficiencies.
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COMPARISON
In a standard format, we will compare each incident:
- Plan of Action
- Communication
- Response Plan
- Plan of Action
- Communication
- Response Plan
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PLAN OF ACTION
GALVESTON
Even if response plans were made, the focus is on warning and communication. No plan can be set in motion if no awareness is present.
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BEHIND THE CURVE
- Disdain for Cuban forecasting prevented early warning
- Centralized US structure prevented early warning
- Flawed prediction model
- No acknowledged risk results in no emergency plan
Plan of Action was developed during the disaster.
- Isaac Cline (local forecaster) began warning residents and urging evacuation to higher ground
- Protect in Place became the only real strategy, but that was more instinctive than directed by officials.
- Isaac Cline (local forecaster) began warning residents and urging evacuation to higher ground
- Protect in Place became the only real strategy, but that was more instinctive than directed by officials.
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CENTRALIZED AUTHORITY
- Strong resentment of Cuban forecasting program
- Extreme control of public information
- Late warning resulted in minimal evacuation
Local forecaster was used to reporting weather conditions, not interpreting ...
- Washington weather bureau maintained low index of suspicion until last minute
- Warning was issued the morning prior to landfall, but...
"While officials in Washington had recognized they were wrong about the storm's track, on one point Moore remained insistent: this couldn't be a hurricane (Roker, 2015, p. 36)."
- Washington weather bureau maintained low index of suspicion until last minute
- Warning was issued the morning prior to landfall, but...
"While officials in Washington had recognized they were wrong about the storm's track, on one point Moore remained insistent: this couldn't be a hurricane (Roker, 2015, p. 36)."
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PROTECT IN PLACE
- The only available action
- Began as the hurricane landed
- Evacuation would have been possible if warnings were allowed
Response was non-existent. The only remaining plan to develop was a recovery plan.
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FEMA Advance Team:
"It was evident that the state lacked sufficient space and resources to coordinate an operation to handle a disaster caused by a major hurricane like Andrew (Mittler, 1997, p. 10)."
Despite a 13 year history of study, discussion, and attempted legislation - there was no improvement.
- Though this statement came after the fact, it highlights the reality that response plans resided at the local level
- State level support was suspect
- This is why local resources were so quickly overwhelmed
- Though this statement came after the fact, it highlights the reality that response plans resided at the local level
- State level support was suspect
- This is why local resources were so quickly overwhelmed
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SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
- State initial assessment of needs was inadequate
- Inaccurate communication with FEMA
- Fear of Federal take-over
Accurate communications, prior to events, clarify relationships, expectations, processes, etc.
- Miscommunication of state / federal relationship at the start: "state officials acknowledged that their initial assessment of requirements for Federal assistance were too low, and that at first they were resistant to the idea ofa massive flood of Federal resources into south Florida (Mittler, 1997, p. 11)."
- FEMA acknowledged blame also... requested IG inspection... "The national emergency management system was acknowledged as being broken, and both the federal government and the state wanted to know why and what should be done to improve it (Mittler, 1997, p. 11)."
- Miscommunication of state / federal relationship at the start: "state officials acknowledged that their initial assessment of requirements for Federal assistance were too low, and that at first they were resistant to the idea ofa massive flood of Federal resources into south Florida (Mittler, 1997, p. 11)."
- FEMA acknowledged blame also... requested IG inspection... "The national emergency management system was acknowledged as being broken, and both the federal government and the state wanted to know why and what should be done to improve it (Mittler, 1997, p. 11)."
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KNOWN DEFICIENCIES
- 1990 Task Force for assessment of emergency preparedness:
- Shelter spaces
- Special needs
- Coordinated Communications and Plans
- Inadequate EM funding
- Low level of public information
1990 Speaker's Task Force on Emergency Preparedness recommendations (Mittler, 1997, p. 9) have all come to fruition.
Reading between the lines:
- local resources were providing assessment & placing support requests
- there was not a sufficient infrastructure to handle it all
Reading between the lines:
- local resources were providing assessment & placing support requests
- there was not a sufficient infrastructure to handle it all
Photo by mag3737
MITIGATION
- An opportunity to embrace the realities that threaten our citizens
- HSPD 7 & 8 don't mention
- Initiative will guide the future
Mitigation has come to be a large focus area, and deserves to be prioritized in any response plan.
That was not always the case:
"The federal government's current policy documents governing emergency management, primarily the National Incident Management System and (HSPD) 7 & 8, do not mention mitigation (Roberts, 2009, p. 128)."
After Hurricane Andrew, VP Gore criticized plentiful availability of recovery funds to scarcity of mitigation funding (Roberts, 2009, p. 133).
Initiative is a driving force in the future:
- Galveston & Andrew had known vulnerabilities
- New Orleans had a history of hurricanes, floods
- World Trade Center had been attacked once
.
.. commitment to mitigation, and initiative to complete the work is essential to the all-hazards approach
That was not always the case:
"The federal government's current policy documents governing emergency management, primarily the National Incident Management System and (HSPD) 7 & 8, do not mention mitigation (Roberts, 2009, p. 128)."
After Hurricane Andrew, VP Gore criticized plentiful availability of recovery funds to scarcity of mitigation funding (Roberts, 2009, p. 133).
Initiative is a driving force in the future:
- Galveston & Andrew had known vulnerabilities
- New Orleans had a history of hurricanes, floods
- World Trade Center had been attacked once
.
.. commitment to mitigation, and initiative to complete the work is essential to the all-hazards approach
TECHNOLOGY
- Weather forecasting has improved since Andrew
- Drones - search / assessment
- Communications capability
Application of new technologies should not be feared.
Successful Application:
- Weather forecasting has improved, now gives detailed images and paths based on variety of data sources.
Future Applications:
- Emergency Service Drones should be prioritized. Offer clear impact to life safety. (FAA regulations are important, but should not hinder/slow drone development)
- Colorado Center of Excellence wildfire aviation branch: developing two way communication service to provide situational awareness. Will be able to provide internet network to enable live mapping, thermal imaging, resource tracking.
Key is to learn and integrate into plans, then become proficient in the use of technology.
Successful Application:
- Weather forecasting has improved, now gives detailed images and paths based on variety of data sources.
Future Applications:
- Emergency Service Drones should be prioritized. Offer clear impact to life safety. (FAA regulations are important, but should not hinder/slow drone development)
- Colorado Center of Excellence wildfire aviation branch: developing two way communication service to provide situational awareness. Will be able to provide internet network to enable live mapping, thermal imaging, resource tracking.
Key is to learn and integrate into plans, then become proficient in the use of technology.
Photo by Trotaparamos
LEGISLATION
- EMAC support
- EWIDS development
- ESAR-VHP creation
Applicable to this case study:
Emergency Management Assistance Compact authorized by Congress in 1996 as result of Hurricane Andrew deficiencies (Castro, et. al. p. 55)."
Main lesson from recent national experience supports a coordinated reliance on state and federal partners.
- Early Warning of Infectious Disease System (EWIDS) for states along borders
- Emergency System for Advanced Registration of Volunteer Health Professionals (ESAR-VHP)
Encourage continual assessment and review of legislation. Look for opportunities to embrace reality of lessons learned - create solutions!
Emergency Management Assistance Compact authorized by Congress in 1996 as result of Hurricane Andrew deficiencies (Castro, et. al. p. 55)."
Main lesson from recent national experience supports a coordinated reliance on state and federal partners.
- Early Warning of Infectious Disease System (EWIDS) for states along borders
- Emergency System for Advanced Registration of Volunteer Health Professionals (ESAR-VHP)
Encourage continual assessment and review of legislation. Look for opportunities to embrace reality of lessons learned - create solutions!
Photo by Numats
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
- Lack of risk prioritization
- Political environment hinderance of planning
- Lack of emergency infrastructure
Reality of Galveston & Florida:
- Risk was known, not acknowledged with appropriate level of sincerity
- Political concerns overshadowed actionable solutions
- Resulted in dysfunctional infrastructure
The hard reality is that the government is still functioning, the properties have been restored, but the devastation to families can never be recovered.
Embrace the Reality!
- Risk was known, not acknowledged with appropriate level of sincerity
- Political concerns overshadowed actionable solutions
- Resulted in dysfunctional infrastructure
The hard reality is that the government is still functioning, the properties have been restored, but the devastation to families can never be recovered.
Embrace the Reality!
Photo by aresauburn™
