Turkey and Iran- Regional Powers

Who are the Kurds?

Why no Kurdistan?

1

The best way is to start with the ‘primary races’ – Mongol, Europeans and Persians – and then graduate to major combinations, or ‘secondary races.’ Out of Mongols and Europeans emerged Turks/Turko-Tartars; and out of Mongols and Persians came Tajiks. Then appeared the most frequent combinations of the primary and secondary races: Turks and Mongols resulting in Kazakhs, and Turks and Persians in Uzbeks.

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Straight lines hide

• "Playground of empires" - shifting boundaries
• Extended neigbourhood
• Multiple identities
• Shifting alliances
• Multiple faultlines

1a

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In contrast to Deobandi clerics’ secular and inclusive approach, the attidue of the same Deobandi clerics (in Pakistan and India) seems to be based on sectarian prejudices, intolerance and violence towards Sunni Sufis, Barelvis and Shias. Therre are several fatwas foramlly issued by the Darul Uloom Deoband in which Shia Muslims have been declard infidel (Kafir) while Sunni Barelvis and Sufis have been delcared biddati (innovators) and mushrik (polytheists). Maulana Mehmood-ul-Hasan, Maulana Hussain Ahmed Madani, Manzoor Nomani and several other top Deobandi clerics have issued similar takfiri fatwas against Shia Muslims and Sunni Barelvi or Sufi Muslims.

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1b

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2

The Ottoman Empire represents one of the largest imperial projects in human history, ruling vast territories in North Africa, the Balkans, and the Middle East over a period of some five centuries. During its history, it did much to sustain Islamic civilization. Outsiders and insiders have had different perceptions of the Ottoman Empire. Outsiders often viewed it as a threat; for insiders, including for much of the time non-Muslims, it represented stability and security.

The period of Suleiman the Magnificent is known as the "Pax Ottomanica." Suleiman the Magnificent is regarded by many Muslims as the near-perfect ruler. Named after King Solomon, whose rule the Qur'an extols, he is reputed to have ruled justly and humanely. He codified Ottoman law, which, based on the Hanafi view where Shariah has no explicit ruling, the Sultan can use qiyas or analogy to extend the law, and virtually replaced Islamic law with kanum. These rules covered taxation and regulation of the military. Both Mongol and Turk tradition understood the rulers' law as sacred. However, the law was far from arbitrary—it was impersonal and was generally administered impartially regardless of gender, religion, ethnicity, or social status (see Gerber, 1994). Jews and Christians often preferred to take their cases to the qadis (Muslim judges), even though they did not have to, because of the qadis reputation for fairness. Technically, the Caliph is subject to Shariah and during Ottoman history several were removed for allegedly violating Shariah

It might be argued that the Ottomans’ decline set in early in the 17th century, precisely at the point when they abandoned the policy of ritually murdering a significant proportion of the royal family whenever a sultan died, and substituted the Western notion of simply giving the job to the first-born son instead. Before then, Ottoman succession had been governed by the “law of fratricide” drawn up by Mehmed II in the middle of the 15th century. Under the terms of this remarkable piece of legislation, whichever member of the ruling dynasty succeeded in seizing the throne on the death of the old sultan was not merely permitted, but enjoined, to murder all his brothers (together with any inconvenient uncles and cousins) in order to reduce the risk of subsequent rebellion and civil war. Although it was not invariably applied, Mehmed’s law resulted in the deaths of at least 80 members of the House of Osman over a period of 150 years. These victims included all 19 siblings of Sultan Mehmed III—some of whom were still infants at the breast, but all of whom were strangled with silk handkerchiefs immediately after their brother’s accession in 1595.

Janissaries

• Elite soldiers of the Caliph
• Praetorian guard
• First in battle
• Recruited from amongst Christian youth
• Regimented and highly privileged life

This was a flexible society in which a servant might surpass his master and the master his own superior, where an artisan might rise to the level of a Grand Vezir and a Grand Vezir fall back to the level of artisan. Such, based on imperial favours and rewards for merit, was the social and administrative organism of the Islamic empire, differing from any in the Christian West. In the general social pattern of the Ottoman Empire at this time, privilege of birth did not exist... Theirs was a meritocracy in which privilege had to be earned.

In the course of his reforms, Suleiman showed special concern for Christian subjects. Their lot, under the maligned "Turkish yoke" proved so superior to that of the serfs of Christendom under certain Christian masters that the inhabitants of neighboring countries might often prefer to escape across the frontier to Turkish territories.

Former superpower

Ataturk

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Role of military

European or Asian?

Islamic revival?

Emerging major economy

Next 10?

3

2600 years old

2600 years in the same locations

Farsi language

Farsi court language of India

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Nadir Shah

Zorastrianism

SHIA
The five Shia principles of religion (usul ad din) are: belief in divine unity (tawhid); prophecy
(nubuwwah); resurrection (maad); divine justice (adl); and the belief in the Imams as successors of the
Prophet (imamah). The latter principle is not accepted by Sunnis.

2a

EXTREMELY CAPABLE

• HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED MINDS
• ABOVE AVERAGE INTELLIGENCE
• CONSUMMATE DIPLOMATS
• FIERCE WARRIORS
• DEADLY COVERT OPERATORS - HIZBOLLAH

Suleimani took command of the Quds Force fifteen years ago, and in that time he has sought to reshape the Middle East in Iran’s favor, working as a power broker and as a military force: assassinating rivals, arming allies, and, for most of a decade, directing a network of militant groups that killed hundreds of Americans in Iraq. The U.S. Department of the Treasury has sanctioned Suleimani for his role in supporting the Assad regime, and for abetting terrorism. And yet he has remained mostly invisible to the outside world, even as he runs agents and directs operations. “Suleimani is the single most powerful operative in the Middle East today,” John Maguire, a former C.I.A. officer in Iraq, told me, “and no one’s ever heard of him.

When Suleimani appears in public—often to speak at veterans’ events or to meet with Khamenei—he carries himself inconspicuously and rarely raises his voice, exhibiting a trait that Arabs call khilib, or understated charisma. “He is so short, but he has this presence,” a former senior Iraqi official told me. “There will be ten people in a room, and when Suleimani walks in he doesn’t come and sit with you. He sits over there on the other side of room, by himself, in a very quiet way. Doesn’t speak, doesn’t comment, just sits and listens. And so of course everyone is thinking only about him.”

The Quds Force had never lost such a high-ranking officer abroad. The day before the funeral, Suleimani had travelled to Shateri’s home to offer condolences to his family. He has a fierce attachment to martyred soldiers, and often visits their families; in a recent interview with Iranian media, he said, “When I see the children of the martyrs, I want to smell their scent, and I lose myself.” As the funeral continued, he and the other mourners bent forward to pray, pressing their foreheads to the carpet. “One of the rarest people, who brought the revolution and the whole world to you, is gone,” Alireza Panahian, the imam, told the mourners. Suleimani cradled his head in his palm and began to weep.

2b

Theocracy

REVOLUTIONARY

OPAQUE

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2c

OFFICIALS in Tehran are not shy about their aim of spreading influence abroad, nor of their apparent success. Even as the efforts of the West and its Sunni Arab allies look distinctly half-hearted, notably in their fight against Islamic State (IS), Tehran can claim, with only a pinch of hubris, to run three Arab capitals: Baghdad, Damascus and Beirut.

This week it may have added a fourth: Sana’a, Yemen’s capital, where on January 20th Shia Houthi rebels took over the presidential palace

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3

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Sufi tradition

Salafi

United and divided by Islam

• Differing interpretations
• Ancient rivalries
• Current faultlines

3a

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Modern?

4

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