Background The protest culture in Kazakhstan has changed significantly since independence. The country's history is marked by the complex social, political and economic interactions that have shaped Kazakhstani society. These factors influenced not only the emergence of a new protest culture in the country, but also the collective behavior of people. Since gaining independence in 1991, President Nursultan Nazarbayev declared the strategic goal of conducting democratic reforms, multi-party systems, and developing a market economy in Kazakhstan (Nazarbayev, 1992). In 1993, the country adopted its first constitution, which established a parliamentary republic model. The Supreme Council of Kazakhstan (a unicameral Parliament) had extensive powers, leading to a political crisis and conflict between the president and the legislature in the 1994 session, in which an opposition group of deputies was formed. In 1995, Nazarbayev dissolved the parliament due to violations of electoral legislation (Cohen, 2008). That same year, a referendum was held to extend Nazarbayev's term until 2000, and a new constitution was adopted in August, according to which the president had even broader powers. Other amendments to the constitution were made in subsequent years (1998, 2007, 2011, 2017) aimed at strengthening Nazarbayev's power. Throughout Nazarbayev's rule, there were violations of citizens' rights to freedom of expression, assembly, and speech. In the early years of independence, the strengthening of Nazarbayev's authoritarian regime was attributed to the desire to conduct rapid reforms to overcome the economic crisis associated with the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, subsequent efforts by the ruling elite were aimed at retaining power in their hands. The elimination of political competitors, establishment of control over the media, restriction of the activities of trade unions and non-governmental organizations, led to a change in the protest culture of Kazakhstanis. If from 1991 to 2000 the opposition had the opportunity to criticize the ruling regime in the legislature, call on their supporters to hold demonstrations and rallies, then after the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (created by young businessmen and officials) was crushed by Nazarbayev's regime, the government changed the normative basis. Changes were made to the laws according to which only party lists could be elected to Mazhilis (lower house of parliament). As a result, the main opposition political parties were destroyed, and others were denied state registration. In the early 2000s, new methods of protest emerged – terrorism based on religious extremism. Thanks to changes in legislation, the government was able to establish control over the religious sphere and eliminate risks to the regime from religious organizations. However, the absence of pluralism of opinions and political forces, authoritarianism and corruption led to the bloodiest protest of Kazakhstanis in January 2022, which also marked a new stage in the evolution of Kazakhstan's protest culture based on the rise of national consciousness among the Kazakh-speaking population. In previous years, the driving force of the opposition was mainly Russian-speaking leaders, parties, and organizations. However, since 2019, there has been a fundamental change and growth in Kazakh-speaking leaders, which is associated with demographic changes, including the increase in the proportion of Kazakh-speaking citizens overall, as well as in major cities.

Evolution of Social Structures in Kazakhstan After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, significant social and economic changes took place in Kazakhstan (Mukhtarov, 2016). The country moved from a socialist system to a market economy, which led to the emergence of new social structures. These changes have affected the protest culture in Kazakhstan, as they created new opportunities and challenges for social movements. One of the significant changes in social structures was the growth of the middle class. The middle class arose thanks to market economic policies that allowed the creation of small and medium-sized businesses (Olcott, 2001). This development created a new class of entrepreneurs who became influential in shaping the country's politics and economy. This new social group brought new values and norms to Kazakhstani society, including the demand for greater political participation and civil rights. The middle class has played a crucial role in the development of Kazakhstani protest culture by supporting the demands of social movements and providing them with resources. Another significant change in social structures was the emergence of a more diverse civil society in Kazakhstan (Korovkin, 2016). This civil society includes various NGOs, independent media and human rights groups that are increasingly promoting social change. These groups have been instrumental in shaping the discourse on social issues and raising public awareness of them. However, social structures in Kazakhstan remain largely hierarchical, with power concentrated in the hands of a few elites (Laruelle & Peyrouse, 2016). The state retained its authoritarian character, limiting opportunities for political and civic participation.

Changes in Collective Behaviors in Kazakhstan The collapse of the Soviet Union marked the beginning of significant changes in the collective behavior of Kazakhstanis, one of them is the emergence of a protest culture. Prior to independence, Kazakhstan was part of the Soviet Union, and the protests were severely repressed by the Soviet authorities (Joffe, 2011). However, after gaining independence, the Kazakhstani population began to exercise their right to protest against government policies and actions. Protest movements in Kazakhstan can be traced back to the early 1990s, when strikes and demonstrations by workers were commonplace in the western regions of the country, where most of the population spoke Kazakh (Vinokurov & Libman, 2014). These protests were largely driven by social and economic grievances such as low wages, unemployment, and poor working conditions. The protests were also influenced by the growth of nationalist sentiments, which called for the protection of Kazakh culture and language. Protest movements in Kazakhstan continued to evolve throughout the 1990s and 2000s, with different groups using different tactics to challenge the government. In the early 2000s, opposition parties and civil society organizations became more active in organizing protests, calling for political reform and democratization (Henderson, 2009). However, in response, the government tightened its grip on power, and protests were increasingly repressed. In 2011, a significant event took place in the protest culture of Kazakhstan, which marked a turning point in the country's political landscape. The Zhanaozen massacre, in which police opened fire on oil workers protesting for better working conditions and higher wages, resulted in at least 14 deaths (International Crisis Group, 2012). The incident sparked mass protests across the country and drew international attention to the human rights situation in Kazakhstan. Following the Zhanaozen massacre, the government of Kazakhstan launched a crackdown on civil society organizations, opposition parties and independent media (Henderson, 2013). The government's response to the protests was seen as an attempt to silence dissent and maintain its power. However, the repression failed to suppress the protest culture in Kazakhstan. In 2022, a new wave of protests swept across Kazakhstan, organized in response to the government's decision to increase fuel prices. The protests, mostly peaceful and organized through social media, have resulted in thousands of people taking to the streets in different parts of the country (Kassenova, 2022). The trigger for these protests was the government's decision to raise fuel prices, which many saw as an unjustified move that would further burden an already struggling population. However, the increase in fuel prices was only the latest in a series of factors that had been brewing for years and have led to a significant shift in the protest culture of Kazakhstan. Since gaining independence in 1991, Kazakhstan has undergone significant changes in its social structures, collective behavior and values. In the early years of independence, the country was characterized by a weak civil society and limited space for political opposition (Beissinger, 2007). However, over time, the country's civil society has become more active and vocal, and there is an increasing participation of people in protests and other forms of collective action. This has been facilitated by the growth of social media, which has provided a platform for people to mobilize and coordinate their actions outside of traditional state-controlled media (Golovnina & Atabayeva, 2022). In addition to the growth of civil society, Kazakhstan has also undergone significant changes in its political landscape. The country's first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, ruled the country for almost three decades, maintaining tight control over power and limiting the space for political opposition. However, Nazarbayev resigned in 2019 and was replaced by Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who introduced a series of reforms aimed at liberalizing the country's political system (International Crisis Group, 2021). These reforms included the introduction of a new public assembly law that made it easier to hold peaceful protests and demonstrations. The changes in social structures and political landscape in Kazakhstan have contributed to the evolution of the country's protest culture. Civil society has become more active and massive, with an increasing number of people participating in protests and other forms of collective action. Moreover, the growth of social media has facilitated the mobilization and coordination of protests, making it easier for people to organize and communicate with each other. This is especially evident in the protests that took place in January 2022, when social media played a key role in mobilizing people and spreading information (Kassenova, 2022). Since independence in 1991, Kazakhstan has undergone significant social and economic changes that have contributed to the emergence of new forms of collective behaviour. These changes have been driven by a combination of external and internal factors, including globalization, technological advances, and demographic shifts. At the same time, the government's response to popular discontent has played a decisive role in shaping the nature and trajectory of Kazakhstan's protest culture.

The evolution of protest culture in Kazakhstan By the end of the 1990s, Nazarbayev had established an authoritarian regime that led to the enrichment of his family members at the expense of the state (McGlinchey, 2011). The situation was further complicated by economic difficulties related to the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis and Russia's default, which led to the first devaluation of the tenge against the US dollar (the average annual exchange rate of the dollar was 78.3 tenge in 1998 and 119.5 tenge in 1999, or +52% (NSB, 2022)), and a further decline in the living standards of the population. All of this led to the mobilization of opposition forces. Following the 1999 presidential elections, Nazarbayev managed to stay in power, including thanks to the use of administrative resources (New Eurasia, 1999), while his main competitor was Serikbolsyn Abdildin, the leader of the Communist Party, whose position was still strong at that time, as only eight years had passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It should be noted that no parliamentary or presidential elections in Kazakhstan have been recognized by the OSCE and other Western observers as democratic, fair, and reflective of political competition (Freedom House, 2022). In 2001, a group of young businessmen and government officials of the higher echelons of power organized the movement "Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan" (DCK), as entrepreneurs suffered from the arbitrariness of Nazarbayev's family members (Junisbai & Junisbai, 2005). The members of the movement had broad financial and media resources, and their main demand was the democratization of the political system. Despite the strong support from society, Nazarbayev was able to destroy the movement, including through violent measures: officials were dismissed from government service, opposition businessmen had their assets seized (Junisbai & Junisbai, 2005), including media assets, and opposition leaders were killed or imprisoned (Odfoundation, 2016). As a result of facing opposition and the fall of authoritarian regimes in other post-Soviet countries during the so-called "color revolutions" from the mid-2000s, Nazarbayev began to curtail democratization processes in all areas of domestic policy. This included the tightening and practical impossibility of registering opposition political parties, the destruction of opposition movements and leaders, restrictions on political events, and more. In addition, control over free media was established, leading to the dominance of media outlets either in state hands or owned by government-friendly businessmen (Freedom House, 2022). The regime adapted the institutional environment to marginalize and exclude the opposition from the political process (Isaacs, 2022). Consequently, based on changes in legislation that allowed for the election of parliamentary deputies in Kazakhstan only through party lists and the destruction of opposition parties, only members of the pro-government party "Nur Otan" were elected to the lower house of the legislative assembly in 2007. In foreign policy, Nazarbayev accelerated cooperation with other authoritarian countries, namely Putin's Russia and China. Kazakhstan became a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001, and in 2006, along with Russia and Belarus, they formed the Customs Union, which was transformed into the Eurasian Economic Union in 2014. In the period following the defeat of the DVK movement, the consolidation of Nazarbayev's regime was based on several factors. Firstly, high prices for energy resources (oil boom) led to an increase in GDP and an influx of petro dollars, which improved the welfare of Kazakhstanis. The government had the opportunity to invest funds in large social, infrastructure, and other projects, even despite the enormous level of corruption in the field of public service and the distribution of state financing. Secondly, the government and controlled media skillfully used the consequences of "color revolutions" in post-Soviet countries, which faced economic difficulties and a decline in living standards, to demonstrate the irrationality of such actions and coups. Against the background of these post-Soviet countries, Nazarbayev was regarded as a sole figure who predetermined the domestic and foreign policy and the structure of Kazakhstan's political system. Strong leadership was seen as the foundation of stability and statehood itself (Karabayeva, 2021; Laruelle, 2012; Lewis, 2011). Therefore, we can see a particular social contract in Kazakhstan stipulating abstention from political engagement in exchange for economic well-being as a foundation for stability (Olcott, 2010; Kudebayeva & Barrientos, 2017; Ibadildin & Pisareva, 2020). In 2019, Nazarbayev announced his resignation and designated the Chairman of the Senate of the Parliament of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, as his successor. Nazarbayev himself took the position of Chairman of the Security Council, which, during changes in the country's legislative framework, transformed into the supreme body of state administration (Commander & Prieskienyte, 2022), and the Chairman of the Security Council became higher in hierarchy than the President. Over the last 20 years, authoritarian tendencies in Kazakhstan have resulted in the government preventing opposition forces from accessing resources such as finances, media, and economics. As a consequence, the government has lacked channels for feedback from protest groups within the population. While representatives of the so-called "systemic opposition" (Communist People's Party, Democratic Party "Ak Zhol") have managed to overcome the electoral threshold and be elected to the lower house of the Parliament (Mazhilis) since 2012, they have compromised themselves by maintaining ties with the government and have low levels of public trust. Authorities did not allow for the institutionalization of a new opposition after the failures of the old opposition and its almost total disappearance by 2015–2016 (Kudaibergenova & Laruelle, 2022). The failure of the old opposition and its near total disappearance by 2015-2016 has prevented the institutionalization of a new opposition, leaving the field open for religious movements of a radical nature (Salafism) to flourish in Kazakhstan, particularly in the west and south (Smagulov, 2011). These movements have represented an alternative to the government, opposition, and other institutionalized forces. However, radical elements have resorted to terrorism as a means of fighting against the government, resulting in terrorist acts being committed in various regions of the country, with the perpetrators following the so-called "Dagestan way" (Shibutov & Abramov, 2012), targeting law enforcement agencies. As a response, Kazakhstan enacted a new "On Religion" Law to replace the previous one, which was developed based on recommendations from international organizations and resulted in the liberalization of the sphere of religious beliefs, allowing for the emergence and legal activity of radical religious groups. However, the new law also made the registration of religious organizations more stringent, which resulted in non-radical religious groups that did not engage in violent actions against the government suffering from its enforcement. In 2011, a mass protest movement occurred in the city of Zhanaozen, where oil company workers demanded higher wages. On December 16, in response to riots, including attacks on state facilities, the government used firearms against the demonstrators (Satpayev & Umbetaliyeva, 2015). In western Kazakhstan, the legacy of the protests has been the realization that protest presents a "possibility" for dialogue with the regime and local authorities in the absence of any other viable institutions or channels for engagement (Kudaibergenova & Laruelle, 2022). In connection with the resignation of Nazarbayev in 2019, a process of desacralization of the first President of Kazakhstan occurred in the country, coupled with hopes for a more democratic future, given the end of the almost 30-year rule of an autocrat. The driving forces of the protests were young people in major cities who organized demonstrations, actively participated as observers in presidential elections, and posted videos of legislative violations on social media. However, the main outcome of the 2019 protests was the rise of Kazakh-speaking population, their active involvement in political processes, which practically marked the rise of national self-awareness. If from 1991 to 2019 the main opposition leaders were Russian-speaking representatives, in 2019 more active and demanding Kazakh-speaking leaders, such as Rinat Zayitov, emerged. Another large-scale anti-government protest occurred in January 2022, which was caused, among other things, by economic inequality (Kudaibergenova & Laruelle, 2022). As in previous years, the protesters targeted law enforcement officers and government buildings and security structures (the Akimat of Almaty, the headquarters of the pro-government party "Nur-Otan," attacks on the territorial Departments of the National Security Committee and the Interior Ministry with the aim of obtaining access to weapons). In the end, 238 people were killed in the protest, including 19 law enforcement officers. The difference with this protest, as noted by some experts (Commander & Prieskienyte, 2022), was that it represented a struggle for power between the new (Tokayev) and ex-Presidents (Nazarbayev). Thus, Tokayev later stated that the January protests were an attempted "unsuccessful state coup." This is also evidenced by the fact that the main regions where mass protests took place were the southern cities and regions - the traditional territory of the Elder Zhuz, from which both Nazarbayev and Tokayev hail. Meanwhile, in the Western regions, where the protest movements originated, the rallies were peaceful, characterized by good coordination on the part of union leaders, and ended immediately after the goals were achieved and government guarantees were obtained. The latent and manifest causes of the mass protests were the socio-economic situation in the regions, the demand for social justice, and the higher concentration of unemployed youth, especially in the south (Ptichkin, 2022). Russia, specifically President Vladimir Putin, played a significant role in the conflict between the former and current presidents of Kazakhstan, by supporting President Tokayev, as evidenced by the deployment of Collective Security Treaty Organization forces to stabilize the situation in the country. However, it is evident that Putin pursued his own goals and interests by supporting Tokayev and helping him maintain power in the country. The events of January 2022 were the bloodiest in the history of Kazakhstan and served as further proof that citizens had no way to influence political decision-making (Kudaibergenova & Laruelle, 2022). The authorities' policy of dismantling democratic institutions of society-government interaction over the past 20 years has led dissatisfied groups to resort to violent forms such as riots and terrorist acts. After January 2022, President Tokayev announced political reforms, but they were only cosmetic and did not lead to fundamental changes in the political system (Umarov, 2022). For instance, the president retained extensive powers, opposition leaders were imprisoned after the January 2022 protests, and opposition political parties still cannot be registered in state bodies. Consequently, there is inequality in promoting political views, political participation, and freedom of action in Kazakhstan. Freedoms of speech and assembly remain restricted (Freedom House, 2022). According to the 2021 Democracy Index calculated by The Economist Intelligence Unit, Kazakhstan ranked 128 out of 167 possible places and was recognized as an authoritarian country (Democracy Index, 2021).

Conclusion The evolution of protest culture among the Kazakhstani people during the political transition period shows that protest groups changed their methods of fighting against the ruling regime by using available means. In the early 1990s, those who were dissatisfied with the Nazarbayev regime had the opportunity to criticize its actions and suggest alternative ways in parliament. However, subsequently, the government passed legislative acts to limit such opposition's ability. As a result, protest groups, particularly their radical ones, have resorted to violent methods (terrorism) and open clashes with government representatives (the Zhanaozen events of 2011 and the January 2022 events), having lost the ability to convey their dissent and ideas to society through channels such as political parties, NGOs, and the media. It should be noted that the processes of forming and developing protest culture in different regions of the country were different, which is associated with several factors. Firstly, demographic processes: southern regions of the country have the highest population growth rates, high population density, and a surplus of labor force, while regions in the east, north, and west of Kazakhstan experience a shortage of personnel. Secondly, distinctive features are also observed in the linguistic environment, where residents in the northern, central, and eastern regions are predominantly Russian-speaking, while those in the southern and western regions are Kazakh-speaking. Thirdly, disparities in economic development: the southern regions are characterized by their lag in economic development compared to the average republican level, which undoubtedly affects the state of the labor market and employment of the population. The southern regions are almost entirely dependent on subsidies from the republican budget, while a significant portion of Kazakhstan's industrial enterprises is located in the northern, eastern, central, and western regions. Fourthly, the western regions of Kazakhstan, where the majority of the population is Kazakh-speaking (in 4 out of 5 western regions of Kazakhstan, the proportion of Kazakhs is over 90%), and where the country's oil and gas enterprises are concentrated, have a long history of protest culture. This is due to both the strong positions of trade unions, which coordinate actions and rallies, and the enormous unresolved socio-economic problems (such as insufficient schools, hospitals, unsatisfactory condition of roads, etc.). Moreover, it is in the western regions that all stages of the development of protest culture have been observed: from workers' rallies in the early 1990s, terrorist acts, violent actions against representatives of the authorities (Zhanaozen, 2011 – the first bloody suppression of demonstrations by the government) to peaceful, highly organized and coordinated performances in January 2022. In contrast, fragmentary protest performances were observed in the southern regions of the country, which did not have a mass character. This was partly because the supreme power in the country is held by representatives of the Great Zhuz, territorially located in the south of the country. However, the rise of national consciousness and the bloody suppression of performances in January 2022 may lead to significant transformations in the protest culture of the population in the southern regions of Kazakhstan. The evolution of Kazakhstanis protest culture over the past three decades has been driven by a range of factors, including changes in social structures, the political landscape, and the growth of civil society. As social and political changes continue to take place in Kazakhstan, it is likely that the protest culture in the country will continue to evolve. The government has already taken some steps to address the underlying issues that have contributed to popular discontent. In February 2022, President Tokayev signed a new law aimed at improving labor protection, a key demand of the January protesters (Chen, 2022). The government has also increased funding for education and health care, two areas that have been the subject of frequent protests. However, it remains to be seen whether these reforms will be sufficient to address the deep-rooted problems that have led to protests in the past. Kazakhstan's economy remains heavily dependent on oil and gas exports, which can lead to boom-and-bust cycles and exacerbate social inequalities (Kassenova, 2018). The country is also facing a number of demographic challenges, including a shortage of skilled workers (Takir, 2020). In the future, the protest culture in Kazakhstan is likely to continue to evolve in response to social, economic and political changes. As the country navigates these changes, it will be important for the government to strike a balance between responding to popular demands for reform and maintaining social stability. At the same time, civil society organizations and other groups will continue to play a critical role in shaping the country's future development trajectory.